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Abstract—This paper characterizes a recently proposed anony-
mous file sharing system, OneSwarm. This characterisation is
based on measurement of several aspects of the OneSwarm
system such as the nature of the shared and searched content and
the geolocation and number of users. Our findings indicate that,
as opposed to common belief, there is no significant difference
in downloaded content between this system and the classical
BitTorrent ecosystem. We also found that a majority of users
appears to be located in countries where anti-piracy laws have
been recently adopted and enforced (France, Sweden and U.S).
Finally, we evaluate the level of privacy provided by OneSwarm,
and show that, although the system has strong overall privacy,
a collusion attack could potentially identify content providers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing continues to be a popular
service for many reasons including the large variety of content
available on the P2P ecosystem, the ease of accessibility with
no sign-up required for downloading content, and good system
performance, particularly when downloading popular content.
P2P applications such as BitTorrent, however, do little to
preserve a user’s privacy. The open nature of these applications
enables easy monitoring and identification of both content
providers and downloaders [5], [9]–[11].
In recent years, a number of file sharing solutions offering
differing degrees of privacy have been adopted, arguably
coinciding with the increased privacy-awareness of Internet
users and the tightening, in some countries, of anti-piracy
laws [3], [6]. Centralized One-Click Hosting services have
emerged as an alternative to P2P file sharing [2] and poten-
tially offer greater degree of privacy. Another approach is to
augment existing P2P systems with solutions that obfuscate
IP addresses, for example, by using standard BitTorrent over
an anonymization network such as Tor [4] or I2P1. BitTorrent
over Tor has been adopted by a large population of users [11],
but anonymity comes at the cost of system performance [5],
[11]. More recently, a promising privacy-aware P2P system,
OneSwarm, was proposed [5]. OneSwarm includes a number
of privacy preserving techniques, and this system is reportedly
used by thousands of users [5].
In this paper, we study the usage and the characteristics
of the OneSwarm system, including the types of content
shared, the geographical location of its users, the size of the
1I2P Anonymous Network http://www.i2p2.de
system and the anonymity provided by the system. We dis-
cuss the possible reasons motivating adoption of OneSwarm,
compared to those for using other common P2P alternatives
(e.g., BitTorrent over Tor and the standard BitTorrent) which
provide varying levels of privacy. We have also developed a
mechanism to exploit the OneSwarm client compatibility and
the apparent use of BitTorrent for downloading content not
currently available in OneSwarm.
Our key observations include the following. We character-
ize the use of OneSwarm, including the likely geographical
locations of users and the type of content shared in the
system. There are strong indications that the vast majority
of users are located in France (around 50%), Sweden (close
to 38%), and the US (under 10%). Our results additionally
indicate that the content shared on OneSwarm is similar to that
shared using other P2P systems. We argue that the motivations
for using file sharing systems can be broadly categorized
as sociological (e.g., the potential implications to the person
downloading or searching for content, in regards to interest
in specific content), legal (e.g., evading infringement notices
for downloading copyrighted material), technological (e.g.,
enabling content download in countries where P2P traffic
is filtered out by ISPs), enhanced awareness (e.g., genuine
interest in preserving privacy), or a combination thereof. We
find strong indicators for the prevalence of the legal/regulatory
policy driven adoption, based on the user locations and the
timing of OneSwarm introduction compared to regulatory
developments in specific countries [3], [6].
The OneSwarm system provides strong overall privacy;
however, we identify a potential collusion attack that can
compromise privacy. We also discuss a privacy breach in-
troduced by the default behaviour of the OneSwarm client,
wherein the client automatically searches for content on the
public BitTorrent system if the content is not found within
OneSwarm.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of OneSwarm. Section 3 describes the measurement
methodology. Our results are presented in Section 4. Section
5 identifies a couple of limitations in the OneSwarm design.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF ONESWARM
OneSwarm uses an overlay network to propagate search
messages and establish connections between peers for down-
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loading content. The connections relate to trust relationships
between nodes (e.g., established via manual or automatic
exchange of public keys), where trust represents the certainty
that the trusted party will not reveal information about activity
of nodes (e.g., the origin of the forwarded traffic). To enable
new user connections, when trusted connections cannot be
established, OneSwarm allows untrusted connections, with
limited interaction between the peers.
OneSwarm uses community servers to automatically es-
tablish both trusted and untrusted connections. These servers
store the identities of the users and allocate connections to
new users. Public community servers facilitate introduction of
new users; new users are allocated a set of untrusted con-
nections with other subscribers of this server. Currently, there
are four public community servers: the default community
server hosted by the University of Washington (UW CSE),
two French servers, oneswarm-fr (OS-fr) and lavilette, and a
Swedish server subcult2.
OneSwarm supports two content identification methods:
Unique Resource Identification (URI) based, which includes
support for the infohash convention used by BitTorrent, and
a content name based method. Correspondingly, two types of
messages are used to search for content: Hash search and Text
search. A Hash search message contains a truncated version of
the infohash of the content. A Text search message contains a
URI or a human readable string representing a set of keywords.
Note that Hash search and Text search containing a URI target
unique content, while a Text search containing keywords can
target any matching content.
The OneSwarm system requires a connection to be es-
tablished between the requester and the provider to facili-
tate content download. OneSwarm uses a flooding algorithm,
wherein a search message targeting a specific content is sent
by the requester and forwarded by the overlay nodes. Once
the message reaches a node that has the targeted content, a
response message is sent back following the same path, thus
completing the connection establishment.
OneSwarm is backward compatible with the standard Bit-
Torrent protocol. The OneSwarm client can handle .torrent
files, and the content associated with a torrent can be down-
loaded either from the OneSwarm network, or from the public
BitTorrent ecosystem. When connected to public BitTorrent
ecosystem, the OneSwarm node concurrently becomes a con-
tent provider on OneSwarm for this content.
III. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
Our measurements consider a combination of OneSwarm
and BitTorrent as shown in Figure 1. The OneSwarm part
comprises of public and private communities, the former
having a number of community servers (CS). For the sake
of simplicity, only one CS is shown in Figure 1. Similarly,
BitTorrent includes public and private components, and a
(large) number of trackers. The nodes which simultaneously




















Fig. 1. Overview of the measurement environment, including the public and
private OneSwarm, and BitTorrent ecosystems.
and BitTorrent, are denoted as bridge nodes (B). We monitor
OneSwarm messages and three major BitTorrent trackers3 over
a period of one month.
For this study, we developed a customized client derived
from the OneSwarm client version 0.6. Our customized
client can generate and monitor all OneSwarm message
types. Our measurement setup includes connecting two
customized clients to all four OneSwarm community servers.
The captured OneSwarm messages are used for analysis and
characterization of the system. We additionally determined
the IP addresses of OneSwarm clients, first from the direct
connections allocated to our nodes by the community servers,
and second using a method which exploits OneSwarm’s
backward compatibility with BitTorrent. As a representative
data set for public BitTorrent use, we collected content
hashes from the Pirate Bay site. Most of our data collection
is restricted to nodes that are directly interacting with the
public communities. We argue that, in practice, due to bridge
nodes (cf. Figure 1) we will observe a mix of traffic from
both private and public communities.
A. OneSwarm Monitoring
We monitor all OneSwarm Hash search and Text search
request messages and use this data to characterize the activity
of the OneSwarm users. We combine this monitoring with
additional BitTorrent monitoring to determine the IP addresses
of bridge nodes and their geolocation. Cautionary measures
were taken to prevent the monitoring nodes from generating
artificial traffic or forwarding messages that could modify the
overlay topology (e.g., monitoring nodes do not act as bridge
nodes between different parts of the network).
During our measurement period, our nodes connected to
190 peers within the 4 public communities. A total of 630
millions4 OneSwarm search messages have been collected,
including 520 million Hash search messages and 110 million
Text messages. Of those, 25, 853 were Text search messages
in plain text, containing keywords which reflect user interest
in specific types of content.
3The BitTorrent trackers monitored are udp://tracker.openbittorrent.com,
udp://tracker.publicbt.com and udp://tracker.istole.it
4This high number is explained by the fact that OS clients are periodically
generating messages while downloading.
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TABLE I
CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT PUBLIC COMMUNITIES IN
ONESWARM NETWORK.
UW CSE oneswarm-fr lavilette
UW CSE 91.9% 83.5% 94.9%
oneswarm-fr 99.3% 99.4% 98.3%
lavilette 97.3% 80.8% 96.2%
To verify the efficiency of our passive traffic monitoring,
we perform an experiment to estimate the fraction of messages
captured by our monitoring nodes, compared to the total num-
ber of messages generated in the system. For this, we introduce
six customized nodes and place two nodes in each of the
three public communities (excluding the Swedish community
server, which was intermittently available). Every 10 seconds,
the controlled nodes send a search message and record all
incoming traffic. From the captured traffic, we then compute
the cross-community connectivity between each pair of our
controlled clients, as represented by the fraction of messages
received by the node in one community, from among those sent
by the node in the second community. The results are reported
in Table I. The observed high connectivity values, i.e. 80.8%
to 99.4%, enable us to be confident that the placement of
monitoring nodes enables capture the majority of the traffic
originating from the public part of the Oneswarm system.
It is however difficult to estimate the fraction of captured
traffic originating from the private part of the network. If
the structure of the overlay network is homogeneous over
the overall network (public and private part), the fraction of
captured traffic from the private parts should be similar to the
one of the public part.
B. Identifying BitTorrent Bridge Nodes
Our method is based on the hypothesis that a number of
OneSwarm clients are acting as BitTorrent bridges. This is
supported by the observed behaviour of OneSwarm clients
which are connecting to the public BitTorrent system and
acting as content importers into OneSwarm.
We use the ability of OneSwarm clients to utilize .torrent
files to identify the IP addresses of bridge nodes. We note
that OneSwarm clients searching for a content source on
OneSwarm in this way will, after an unsuccessful search
period (of 90 seconds), automatically connect to the cor-
responding BitTorrent tracker5. The passive monitoring of
OneSwarm captures all content search messages. We addi-
tionally use the torrent data set from the Pirate Bay site.
For each new content instance observed in the Hash search
message set, we correlate the truncated infohash (cf. Section
II) to the full BitTorrent infohash. We then start monitoring the
corresponding BitTorrent tracker for newly connected peers.
The tracker is monitored for a period of 5 minutes (heuristic
value). Finally, from the set of newly detected BitTorrent peers,
we select those using the OneSwarm client (determined by
verifying that their BitTorrent client identifier starts with -OS).
To capture the newly connected peers, we first have to
capture the full set of peers currently connected to this tracker



























The Pirate Bay database
Fig. 2. Content ‘type’ frequency comparison between the torrents found on
OneSwarm, BitTorrent over Tor, and the Pirate Bay.
and then attempt to identify the new peers close to the time
of their initial connection. Obtaining both sets of peers in the
short time frame available necessitated the use of a number of
proxies, as the tracker limits the rate of queries from a specific
IP address. To minimize the amount of resources required for
monitoring and still ensure the capture of the majority of peers,
we limited our measurements to swarms with an advertised
size of less than 1000 peers. We additionally note that the
generous time frame allocation (5 minutes) enables a high
likelihood of capturing bridge nodes, regardless of the delays
in the OneSwarm overlay. This time is also required to ensure
that the majority of peers, including the newly connected
peers, have been collected from the tracker site.
We identified 778 unique OneSwarm users downloading
content through BitTorrent. We argue with a high likelihood
that these OneSwarm clients used on BitTorrent are also part
of OneSwarm, due to the fact that the search for the same
content is being detected within a short time frame of the
captured BitTorrent activity of these clients.
detect new peers. Indeed the number of random subset
required to obtain a particular element increases quickly with
the size of the set (interested reader may refer to the coupon
collector problem [1]).
IV. RESULTS
Our characterization of the OneSwarm system attempts to
answer a number of questions: What is the nature of the
content that is searched for and downloaded? Where are the
users located? What is the size of the system? We then discuss
the motivation to use this anonymous file sharing system.
A. Characterizing the Content
We compared content downloaded on OneSwarm with
that found on a typical BitTorrent ecosystem and BitTorrent
over Tor. For OneSwarm, we consider the torrents that have
been downloaded at least once during our passive monitoring
(77000 content in total). In the case of the Pirate Bay, we
consider the approximately 1.3 million torrents available at
the time of data collection. The BitTorrent over Tor data set
is composed of torrents collected at the output of six Tor exit
nodes as reported in [10].
Our analysis is based on the meta-information associated to
torrents hosted by The Pirate Bay website. More particularly
we consider the two level content classification, by ’type’ and
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by ’subtype’. Figure 2 shows the results from our analysis. We
observe that the available content in either systems is similar,
while noting only a minimal difference for the video, porn,
and audio types.
B. Characterizing Keyword Based Search
The OneSwarm system allows users to search for content
using keywords in a privacy preserving manner. We have col-
lected a total of 25853 search strings issued on the OneSwarm
system. We compare the most popular search strings to similar



















































































































Fig. 3. Relative frequency of string searches.
Figure 3 shows the relative frequency of the most popular
strings for both OneSwarm and Pirate Bay content. Notice that
the most popular search string on OneSwarm are different than
the corresponding ones of the Pirate Bay. The search string
french is the most popular on OneSwarm. In general, in the
OneSwarm data set we have observed very few strings related
to languages other than French.
Pornography related strings are highly represented on the
Pirate Bay. Although these search strings can also be found
on OneSwarm, they are in smaller numbers and have smaller
relative frequency. It seems that people using the anonymous
search engine are not primarily interested in pornographic
content, and therefore, not motivated by sociological reasons
such as hiding interest in such content.
C. Geolocalisation of Users
We determined the geographic location of OneSwarm users
using an IP-to-geolocation database7. As mentioned in Section
3, we identified users that were assigned to our monitoring
nodes by the community servers (Community server Set) as
well as users that were identified by monitoring BitTorrent
bridge nodes (BitTorrent Set). There are 190 and 778 unique
users (IP addresses) in the Community server Set and the
BitTorrent Set, respectively.8
6The fonts of tag cloud, available at http://thepiratebay.org/searchcloud,
show the popularity of a string relative to the popularity of the most popular
string.
7http://www.maxmind.com/app/ip-location
8Our analysis was performed on-the-fly. We do not store any information
such as IP addresses, user identities, or public keys.
TABLE II
COUNTRY REPRESENTATION IN ONESWARM.







COUNTRY REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC COMMUNITY SERVERS.
UW CSE oneswarm-fr subcult.org
FR 43.27% 90.70 % 71.42%
SWE 7.01% 1.76% 19.0%
US 25.14% 2.21% 4.76%
Table II presents results of the country-wise breakdown
of OneSwarm user locations; Table III presents the same
information for users found in the Community Server Set
classified by the identity of the server9. Both tables show
that an overwhelming majority of the users (among those
discovered) are based in France. In the BitTorrent set, Sweden
and the US account for the next biggest group of users. We
notice that only few Swedish IPs were found on the default
community server, and even on the Swedish community server
(subcult.org) they represent only 19% of the users. There
are two possible explanations for what we observe. Either
the BitTorrent backward compatibility feature is prevalently
used among OneSwarm’s Swedish users, or these users do
not rely on community servers to establish new connections
in OneSwarm and instead manually exchange public keys. In
fact, the OneSwarm official forum10 hosts a thread, dedicated
to manual exchange of public keys of Sweden-based users, that
includes more than 1200 public keys. This possibly explains
the low presence of users from Sweden in our Community
server Set, although Sweden is well-represented (28.12% of
the collected IPs) in the BitTorrent Set.
The distribution of user per country in Oneswarm largely
differs of the one of BitTorrent [12]. Some countries like
Netherlands, Luxembourg, China and Russia are almost absent
from Oneswarm, while they are in the most represented
countries on BitTorrent. A large fraction of Oneswarm’s users
are based in France and Sweden, countries that have enacted
strong Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Enforcement
laws [3], [6] (IPRPE laws). In other words, amongst the highly
represented countries in the BitTorrent ecosystem, those with
weak or no IPRPE laws have not adopted Oneswarm, while a
subset of those with strong IPRPE laws have largely adopted in
Oneswarm. The existence of IPRPE laws in a country appears
to be a possible reason for Oneswarm adoption, we call this the
Copyright law effect. The wide adoption of OneSwarm in those
countries can also be explained by social propagation and the
existence of community of users. Indeed regional community
servers has been deployed in those countries along with forums
enabling the creation of a strong community of users. In order
9Lavilette and subcult community servers were not included in this exper-


























































Fig. 4. System activity and number of active downloads as a function of
time (GMT).
to assess the importance of the copyright law effect, it will
be interesting to study how OneSwarm use evolves as other
countries introduce stringent copyright laws.
D. Characterizing the System Activity
The search messages in OneSwarm can be divided into two
categories: keyword-based and URI-based messages. To locate
or download a content, either the OneSwarm user sends a Text
search message, containing keywords that may target several
contents, or the client sends a URI-based search message (Text
or Hash search messages) targeting a unique content. Further,
once the download is initiated, for performance purposes, the
OneSwarm client keeps periodically11 sending the URI-based
search messages in the quest of potential new resources, or to
update the list of connected known locations.
To analyze the network activity of OneSwarm, we consider
the first category, i.e., the keywords-based search traffic, as
an indicator of human activity as very often these messages
require human-machine interactions. We then consider the
second category of search messages, as an indication of active
downloads. Since an active download is generating a search
message for the content every 10 minutes, an estimate of the
number of active downloads can be computed from the number
of search messages observed over a given period of time.
Figure 4 shows our results for system activity. Time-of-day
non-stationarity, similar to those observed for in many other
network measurements, is observed. The observed traffic is the
sum of the traffic of users in different time zones, a fraction
of them being continuously connected while others may only
be periodically online. According to Akamai statistics12, the
highest Internet activity in the European regions is observed
between 2 PM and 6 PM GMT, which coincides with the
time frame of highest activity on OneSwarm. This observation
lends further credence to our hypothesis that a large fraction
of OneSwarm users are located in Europe.
E. Estimation of the Population Size
By design, OneSwarm prevents observers from either iden-
tifying or crawling its users. We estimate the number of
11Every 10 minutes in the OneSwarm client version 0.6.
12http://www.akamai.com/html/technology/nui/retail/charts.html
TABLE IV
ESTIMATION OF THE COMMUNITY SERVER POPULATION SIZE.
UW CSE oneswarm-fr lavilette
estimated size 2518 666 51
95 % conf. (2002;3394) (553; 780) (45;59)
OneSwarm users by leveraging the interaction with each of the
public community servers. Specifically, when a user subscribes
to a community server, the latter returns a list of 20 peers that
are the closest to the subscriber13. By subscribing multiple
times to a community server, using a different randomly
generated public key, we can collect different sets of peers.
By estimating the relative size of redundancy occurring during
multiple subscriptions, a rough estimate of the population size
can be obtained.
We estimated each of the communities’ population size
using a Mark-and-Recapture method and the Schumacher-
Eschmeyer estimator [8] . A total of n samples are collected,
each sample i containing Ci peers. We note Ri the number of
peers in capture i that have already been collected in previous
samples, and Mi the number of distinct peers collected before
sample i. The Schumacher-Eschmeyer estimator of the server











For each community server, we subscribed 20 times, each
time with a different identity. The results from our estimation
are shown in Table IV. The UW CSE community has the
largest population, possibly because it was the first, and
the default community server, for the system. Similarly, we
estimated the overlap between those communities, and our
results show that there were in the order of 3000 users on
those community servers.
V. PRIVACY IN ONESWARM
OneSwarm provides a high level of privacy to its users. In
this section, we discuss two limitations that can result in a
privacy breach.
A. The case of peer identification through BitTorrent
The backward compatibility with BitTorrent can enable
identification of OneSwarm users that download content from
the public BitTorrent ecosystem (see Section III-B). We notice
that the default OneSwarm client behaviour may not be
apparent to the users, as there is no visible indication that
the client switches from the anonymous to the public mode.
Adding a user warning or, preferably, user control of this
feature, is a potential for further improvement in OneSwarm.
B. Indirect collusion attacks
In OneSwarm, a Hash search message is forwarded only if
a node does not posses the requested content. This feature
can be exploited by a set of colluding nodes, to infer the
possession of a content by a targeted node. A direct collusion
13Distance between subscribers is defined in terms of distances between
users’ public keys.
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Fig. 5. Collusion attack configuration.
attack consists of an initiator that sends a Hash search message
to the directly connected target node, while a set of observers
monitor the traffic coming from the directly connected target.
Depending on whether or not the Hash search message has
been forwarded to the observers, the colluding nodes are able
to infer if the content is shared by the target or not. Introduced
by OneSwarm’s designers, probabilistic forwarding [5] was
supposed to solve this issue by making the attack ineffective
unless the attacker controls a large number of nodes directly
connected to the target. Prusty et. al. [7] recently shown that
this countermeasure was not sufficient and that direct collusion
attack was practical.
We present an even more powerful variant of the collusion
attack, wherein the observers are not directly connected. Note
that messages forwarded by a targeted node will propagate
through the overlay network and may be detected by monitor-
ing nodes placed anywhere in the overlay network. As shown
in Section III-A, a small set of monitoring nodes is sufficient
for collection of a significant portion of the traffic generated
by a node in the public community (e.g., one monitoring
node capture 80% or more of the traffic). By replaying the
attack a number of times, and by increasing the number of
monitoring nodes, the confidence in the inference can be made
arbitrarily close to one. Figure 5 shows the configuration of
the attack, where one initiator node is directly connected to
the targetet node replay search messages, while monitoring
nodes are connected to the F2F network, but not necessarly to
the targeted node. The initiator node send search messages to
the target node, which in turn will forward them to the rest of
the F2F network. Those messages will propagate through the
F2F network and eventually reach the monitoring modes.
By design a request message for a content shared by the
target will not be forwarded, the false negative probability is
therefore equal to zero. A false positive is when the message is
forwarded but not received by the monitoring nodes. Meaning
that the message has not been propagated to the monitoring
nodes. Let Mi be the event where the i− th search message
sent to the target is detected by at least one monitoring node.




(1− P (Mi|content is not shared)) = (1− α)
n
Where α is the probability that a message forwarded by the
target is detected by at least one monitoring node. The value of
α can be evaluated in the same way the connectivity between
community was evaluated in section III-A . Its value depends
on the number of monitoring nodes and the topology of the
network between the target and the monitoring nodes. In the
case of a target node and only one monitoring node, both
connected to public communities, we can infer from Table I
that α ≥ 80.8%.
We performed an experiment to test the effectiveness of an
indirect collusion attack, with one directly connected node,
a target node with known content, and only one monitoring
node connected to the four public community servers and
100 replays of the search message. We have been able to
capture the availability of specific content with a false negative
probability of 0% and false positive probability of 2.02%.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a measurement-driven study of the
OneSwarm system, with the goal of understanding the usage
of this privacy-aware file sharing systems. We observe that
content shared in the system is similar to that shared in
other P2P systems and that a vast majority of users are
located in few countries (France, Sweden, and US). Even if
propagation in social media can explain this adoption, we
observe that the highly represented countries have recently
adopted anti copyright infringement laws, suggesting that the
adoption of OneSwarm has been motivated by legal aspect. We
conclude by identifying two limitations that may compromise
the privacy of OneSwarm users.
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